Once you have formed this abstract representation of the Stag Hunt game, you can see Stag Hunts in many places. David Hume also has the Stag Hunt. His most famous illustration of a convention has the structure of a two-person Stag Hunt game:
Two men who pull at the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other. ...
Both men can either row or not row. If both row, they get the outcome that is best for each -just as in Rousseau's example, when both hunt the stag. If one decides not to row then it makes no difference if the other does or not -they don't get anywhere. The worst outcome for you is if you row and the other doesn't, for then you lose your effort for nothing, just as the worst outcome for you in the Stag Hunt is if you hunt stag by yourself.
We meet the Stag Hunt again in the meadow-draining problem of Hume's Treatise:
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind, and each may perceive that the immediate consequence of failing in his part is the abandoning of the whole project. But 'tis difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action ... where Hume observes that achieving cooperation in a many-person Stag Hunt is more difficult than achieving cooperation in a two-person stag hunt. 1 The Stag Hunt does not have the same melodramatic quality as the Prisoner's Dilemma. It raises its own set of issues, which are at least as worthy of serious consideration. Let us focus, for the moment, on a two-person Stag Hunt for comparison to the familiar two-person Prisoner's Dilemma.
If two people cooperate in Prisoner's Dilemma, each is choosing less rather than more. In Prisoner's Dilemma, there is a conflict between individual rationality and mutual benefit.
In the Stag Hunt, what is rational for one player to choose depends on his beliefs about what the other will choose. Both stag hunting and hare hunting are equilibria. That is just to say that it is best to hunt stag if the other player hunts stag and it is best to hunt hare if the other player hunts hare. A player who chooses to hunt stag takes a risk that the other will choose not to cooperate in the Stag Hunt. A player who chooses to hunt hare runs no such risk, since his payoff does not depend on the choice of action of the other player, but he foregoes the potential payoff of a successful stag hunt. Here rational players are pulled in one direction by considerations of mutual benefit and in the other by considerations of personal risk.
Suppose that hunting hare has an expected payoff of 3, no matter what the other does. Hunting stag with another has an expected payoff of 4. Hunting Stag alone is doomed to failure and has a payoff of zero. It is clear that a pessimist, who always expects the worst, would hunt hare. But it is also true with these payoffs that a cautious player, who was so uncertain that he thought the other player was as likely to do one thing as another, would also hunt hare. 2 That is not to say that rational players could not coordinate on the stag hunt equilibrium that gives them both better payoff, but it is to say that they need a measure of trust to do so.
I told the story so that the payoff of hunting hare is absolutely independent of how others act. We could vary this slightly without affecting the underlying theme. 5 According to Hobbes, the Foole's mistake is to ignore the future.
David Hume invokes the same considerations in a more general setting:
Hence I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me and with others. How can we analyze the shadow of the future? We can use the theory of indefinitely repeated games. Suppose that the probability that the Prisoner's Dilemma is will be repeated another time is constant. In the repeated game, the Foole has the strategy Rawls' maximin player is Hobbes' Foole. 9 The Shadow of the Future has not solved the problem of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma; it has transformed it into the problem of cooperation in the Stag Hunt.
In a larger sense, the whole problem of adopting or modifying the social contract for mutual benefit can be seen as a Stag Hunt. For a social contract theory to make sense, the state of nature must be an equilibrium. Otherwise there would not be the problem of transcending it. And the state where the social contract has been adopted must also be an The problem of reforming the social contract has the same structure. Here, following Binmore, we can then take the relevant "state of nature" to be the status quo, and the relevant social contract to be the projected reform. The problem of instituting, or improving, the social contract can be thought of as the problem of moving from riskless Hunt Hare equilibrium to the risky but rewarding Stag Hunt equilibrium. what the other will do. But rational choice based game theory as usually conceived, has nothing to say about how or why such a change of mind might take place.
Let us turn to the tradition of Hume. Hume emphasized that social norms can evolve slowly:
"Nor is the rule regarding the stability of possession the less derived from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression..."
We can reframe our problem in terms of the most thoroughly studied model of cultural evolution, the replicator dynamics. If we ask in this framework, how one can get from the Hunt Hare equilibrium to the Hunt Stag equilibrium, the answer is that you can't! In the vicinity of the state where all Hunt Hare, Hunting Hare has the greatest payoff. If you are close to it, the dynamics carries you back to it. This reasoning holds good over a large class of adaptive dynamics. The transition from non-cooperation to cooperation seems impossible.
Perhaps the restriction to deterministic dynamics is the problem. We may just need to add some chance variation. We could add some chance shocks to the replicator dynamics 10 or look at a finite population where people have some chance of doing the wrong thing, or just experimenting to see what will happen. 11 If we wait long enough, chance variation will bounce the population out of hare hunting and into stag hunting.
But in the same way, chance variation can bounce the population out of stag hunting into hare hunting. Can we say anything more than that the population bounces between these two states? Yes, we know how to analyze this system 12 but the news is not good. When the chance variation is small, the population spends almost all its time in a state where everyone hunts hare. 13 It seems that all we have achieved so far is to show how the social contract might degenerate spontaneously into the state of nature.
Social contracts do sometime spontaneously dissolve. But social contracts also form. And there is experimental evidence that people will hunt stag even when it is a risk to do so. 14 This suggests the need for a richer theory.
III: Local Interaction
The foregoing discussion proceeded in terms of models designed for random Hegselmann, Gary Mar, and Elliott Sober. In some cases local interactions make a spectacular difference in the outcome of the evolutionary (or learning) process.
Does local interaction make a difference in the Stag Hunt? Can it explain the institution of the social contract? The news gets worse. Glenn Ellison (1993) investigates the dynamics of the Stag Hunt played with neighbors, where the players are arranged on a circle. He finds limiting behavior not much different than that in the large population with random encounters. With a small chance of error, the population spends most of its time hunting hare. The difference in the dynamics of the two cases is that given local interaction, the population approaches its long run behavior much more rapidly. The moral for us, if any, is that in small groups with local interaction the degeneration of the social contract into the state of nature can occur with great rapidity.
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There is, however, a small glimmer of light from the following fable. 16 There is a central figure in the group, who interacts (pairwise) with all others and with whom they interact -you might think of him as the Boatman in honor of Hume or the Huntsman in honor of Rousseau. Every round, players revise their strategies by choosing the best response to their partners' prior play, with the exception that the Huntsman revises his strategy much less often. We add a small chance of spontaneously changing strategy for each player. If everyone hunts stag and the Huntsman spontaneously switches to hunting hare, in two rounds probably everyone will hunt hare. But conversely, if everyone is hunting hare and the Huntsman spontaneously switches to hunting stag, in two rounds probably everyone will hunt stag. In the long run the population spends approximately half its time hunting hare and half its time hunting stag. The story does not speak to all our concerns, but at least it shows that the social contract need not have negligible probability in the long run and that the structure of local interaction can make a difference 17 .
IV: Dynamics of Interaction Structure
Still, it is hard not to feel that there must be something fundamental that is missing from our analysis. I would like to suggest that what is missing is an account of the evolution of the structure of interactions. Game theory takes the interaction structure as fixed. But in real life individuals adjust with whom they interact on the basis of past experience. This as a fundamental aspect of social behavior that is completely absent from the theory of games.
Let me show you how the analysis of the Stag Hunt is changed if individuals can learn with whom to interact. What follows is the result of joint work with Robin
Pemantle. 18 Suppose that we have a small group of agents, some disposed to hunt stag and some disposed to hunt hare. They start out interacting at random, but when agents interact they are reinforced for interaction with the same agent by the payoff that they receive from the interaction. Reinforcement modifies the probability that one agent will choose to interact with another.
How do these interaction probabilities evolve? It can be shown, both by simulation and analytically, that stag hunters learn to interact with other stag hunters.
This, perhaps, should come as no great surprise. It is not quite so obvious that hare hunters will end up interacting with other hare hunters. Hare hunters do not care with whom they interact. Nevertheless it is so. 19 Learning dynamics leads to a structure of interaction probabilities quite different from that of a random pairing model. In this environment, stag hunters prosper.
Now we can add the further consideration of players revising their strategies.
Suppose that once in a while a player looks around the little group, sees who is doing best, and imitates that strategy. If interaction structure were fixed at random pairing, we would be back were we started and the most likely outcome would be that everyone would end up hunting hare. But if structure is fluid and the learning dynamics for structure is fast relative to the strategy revision dynamics, stag hunters will find each other and then imitation will slowly convert the hare hunters to stag hunters. This conclusion is robust to the addition of a little chance. Here, we finally have a model that can explain the institution of a modest social contract.
In between the extremes, the limiting outcome in a small group may be either all hare hunters or all stag hunters. Which outcome one gets depends somewhat on the vicissitudes of chance in the early stages of the evolution of the group. But it is also strongly influenced by the relative speeds of structure and strategy dynamics. Rapid structural adaptation favors the stag hunters. Our social contract may form in some circumstances but not in others.
We can consider different strategy revision dynamics. Suppose, as before, that structure dynamics is fast relative to strategy revision, but that the individuals never look around the group for successful models, but rather choose the best response to the strategy that they have encountered on the last play. Then the ultimate outcome will be that the group is divided into two stable classes, the stag hunters and the hare hunters, which never interact with one another. A different kind of strategy revision leads to a different social contract. There are other interesting possibilities to explore.
Conclusion
We should pay more attention to the Stag Hunt. There is a lot to think about. Real stag hunts are complex interactions between more than two people. So are the social contracts -large and small -that we have used the Stag Hunt to represent. In our analysis of two-person Stag Hunts we finally focused on the coevolution of strategy and interaction structure. I believe that this is a key to the larger question of the emergence of social structure.
